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This research examines the requirements of a capability portfolio for protecting a 
maritime force against a conventional small boat swarm attack. It provides decision 
makers with insights gleaned from exploring the trade space between weapon 
consumption, fuel consumption, and cost against the need to protect the force. Such an 
attack can deplete a force’s resources and create risk to overall mission accomplishment. 
In this research, the Iranian training attack on a mock U.S. aircraft carrier in the 
Strait of Hormuz in February 2015 is the basis for the modeled scenario. A notional U.S. 
carrier group forms the baseline capability. An agent-based simulation scenario models 
the effectiveness of various capability options added to the baseline. These options 
include maturing developments such as the littoral combat ship (LCS) with modified 
Hellfire missiles, Spike LR missiles adapted onto autonomous 11-m unmanned surface 
vessels (USV), and advanced precision kill weapon system II missiles carried by Fire 
Scout tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV). A nearly orthogonal and balanced 
design, with 512 design points, yields broad insights and ensures an efficient experiment. 
Partition tree analysis, a non-parametric regression technique, identifies the presence and 
strength of influential factors. Efficient mixes of LCS, USVs, or TUAVs prove to be 
critical elements of protecting the maritime force while preserving its capabilities to 
accomplish the overall mission. 
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This research provides insights to decision makers on selecting an operational 
energy-efficient and cost-effective capability portfolio for the protection of a maritime 
force against a conventional small boat swarm attack. It examines the trade space 
between weapon consumption, fuel consumption, and cost, as well as identifies effective 
and feasible operational energy options to be part of the capability portfolio against small 
boat swarms. 
A small boat swarm is a cheaper, asymmetric threat that can deplete a naval 
force’s resources and create risk to overall mission accomplishment. This threat is 
asymmetric in terms of its numbers, agility and nimbleness. The U.S. Navy needs an 
operational energy capability portfolio analysis to ensure that it can achieve its 
conventional warfare missions. Such a portfolio should concurrently be cost-effective to 
ensure good use of finite defense dollars and not overspend on defense against the small 
boat swarm threat. These issues give rise to the main research question: How can we 
select an energy-efficient and cost-effective capability portfolio to defend against, and 
reduce disruption to conventional missions facing, an unanticipated asymmetric threat’s 
attack? 
The IRGCN 2015 training attack on a mock U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in the Strait 
of Hormuz during February 2015 inspires the operational scenario. The adversary 
comprises a notional swarm of IRGCN small boats carrying anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCM) and adopting a multi-axis surprise attack. This thesis analyzes existing and 
maturing capability portfolio options to defend against the swarm attacks. The baseline 
capability is a typical carrier group comprising one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, two 
destroyers and one oiler assumed transiting to the Persian Gulf for a conventional 
mission. Limiting the notional maturing capability options to those reaching maturity for 
equipping within the next 10 to 15 years makes these options useful in informing decision 
makers today. The notional options include the littoral combat ship (LCS) with modified 
Hellfire missiles, 11-m autonomous unmanned surface vehicles (USV) armed with Spike 
long-range (LR) missiles, and Fire Scout tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV) 
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armed with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS) missiles. We 
explore different mixes of these capabilities as augmentation to the baseline capability. 
As a key instrument in the systems engineering approach to study capability 
requirements, computer experimentation is a powerful and proven method. It is 
increasingly the primary choice for exploring the decision space of complex problems; in 
particular, the trade space in a capability portfolio. Experimentation enables analysts to 
obtain insights by testing different variables, such as force configuration and weapon use 
policy, with regard to certain performance measures. Such insights identify required 
capabilities that meet mission objectives. The scenario is instantiated using Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA), an agent-based simulation software platform. Figure 1 
shows a snapshot of a simulation run in MANA with enemy units in yellow and friendly 
units in blue. 
 
Figure 1. Snapshot of a Simulation Run in MANA (Enemy Units in 
Yellow; Friendly Units in Blue). 
 xvii
We used a design of experiment (DOE) approach to study key input factors, vary 
such factors systematically, and seek the most insights from the simulation efficiently. 
Controllable factors include the numbers of platforms and the use of surface-to-air 
missiles. Uncontrollable factors cover weapon hit probabilities and sensor ranges for both 
forces, as well as the number of enemy boats. We use the partition tree tool in JMP, a 
statistical discovery software from SAS, for the data analysis. We analyze the modeling 
results, broadly, in terms of force protection effectiveness, weapon and fuel consumption, 
and financial costs. 
In answering the research question, the results provide useful insights into the 
influential factors, as well as energy- and cost-efficient configurations involving the 
maturing capabilities.  
The number of LCSs, as part of a reconnaissance force ahead of the carrier group, 
is most influential in reducing the mean missile leakers, the mean boat leakers, the mean 
use of friendly surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and the mean cost of overall weapons 
expended. This is likely due to the number and range of the modified Hellfire missiles the 
LCS carries, as compared to the Spike LR and APKWS weapons. The LCS also enables 
armed TUAV operations by carrying and deploying the TUAVs. In turn, adding LCSs 
increases the mean fuel consumed and the mean cost of added force. 
Arming the TUAVs with the APKWS has a partial influence on reducing the use 
of SAMs, Hellfire missiles, Spike missiles, and the overall cost of weapons expended. 
This is mainly due to the APKWS being the cheapest missile used against the enemy 
boats. The number of TUAVs has similar effects, but to a lesser extent. 
The number of USVs is generally not influential in improving mission 
performance. This is likely due to the small number and short range of the Spike missiles 
the USV carries. 
This thesis identifies a minimum configuration for the reconnaissance force, 
specifically having at least three LCSs and five to six armed TUAVs, to attain zero and 
close to zero (0.5) missile and boat leakers, assuming the LCSs carry and deploy the 
armed TUAVs. Such a configuration resulted from the LCS and armed TUAV being 
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more influential on reducing leakers, as compared to the USV equipped with Spike 
missiles. This minimum configuration ensures that the naval force could continue 
unharmed on its conventional mission. 
Imposing upper limits, from an efficiency perspective, on the reconnaissance 
force’s diesel and aviation fuel consumption, as well as costs of weapons expended and 
added force, reduces the maximum number of LCSs and TUAVs that can be deployed. 
Mitigating policies, including operational and doctrinal ones, to defend 
successfully against conventional attacks from a small boat swarm involve selecting a 
“right-sized” mix of LCSs and armed TUAVs, that can provide effective force protection 
and, at the same time, limit fuel consumption, cost of weapons expended, and cost of 
added force. 
Notional near term R&D options of increasing LCS Hellfire missile capacity, 
USV Spike missile capacity, TUAV APKWS missile capacity, and Spike missile range 
are not influential in improving mission performance. Scaling autonomous USV 
technology to deploy up to 24 USVs from the current five has a moderate influence on 
reducing missile leakers. Compared with the R&D options, the number of LCSs and 
arming the TUAVs appear to be better investments if greater performance is desired. 
The uncontrollable factors have minimal impact on missile and boat leakers, fuel 
and weapon consumption, and costs. The capability options perform relatively robustly 
across a slew of different weapon hit probabilities, sensor range performances, and 
enemy boat numbers.  
Three LCSs with five to six armed TUAVs is a preliminary optimal force 
configuration, assuming the LCSs carry and deploy the TUAVs. 
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This research provides decision makers with insights gleaned from examining the 
trade space between weapons expended, fuel consumption, and cost in protecting a 
maritime force against a conventional small boat swarm attack.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A small boat swarm is a large number of inexpensive, agile, and armed boats that 
pose an asymmetric threat to the U.S. Navy’s conventional warfare missions. This threat 
is asymmetric in terms of its numbers, agility and nimbleness. The swarm boat threat has 
been extensively studied in literature such as IHS (2014b), ONI (2009, 23) and 
Haghshenass (2006). Due to their large numbers, these boats can saturate and penetrate a 
more expensive and advanced task group’s defenses. The small boat swarm attacks 
deplete the force’s resources and create risk to overall mission accomplishment. A recent 
demonstration of this asymmetric threat is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy 
(IRGCN) attack on a mock U.S. aircraft carrier with tens of speedboats during a major 
training exercise in the Strait of Hormuz (IHS 2015c; New York Times 2015). Various 
literature, such as ONI (2009) and Haghshenass (2006; 2008), describe IRGCN’s strategy 
of small boat swarm attacks. A likely extension of the swarm boat attack is China’s 
potential use of stealthy Type 022 catamarans with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCM), a potential scenario described by Navarro (2016).  
Within the systems engineering (SE) process, requirements development is a 
critical step for ensuring that stakeholder needs are met. It remains true in the study of 
this capability package. An operational energy (defined in ODASD(OE) 2016) capability 
portfolio is needed to ensure operational reach (defined in Mullen 2011, GL-15) in the 
U.S. Navy’s conventional warfare missions. Such a portfolio should concurrently be cost-
effective to ensure good use of finite defense dollars and not overspend on defense 
against the asymmetric threat. For instance, the U.S. Navy is experimenting with robotic 
boat swarms to counter the small boat swarm attacks (Hsu 2014; IHS 2014a)—but how 
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sustainable is this robotic swarm in terms of operational energy? Does it make economic 
sense to spend much more on defense against a less expensive threat than to unlock 
resources for other critical military capabilities? Effective force protection must still be 
maintained if more energy-efficient and less costly capability portfolio options are 
desired. These issues lead to the main research question: How can we select an energy-
efficient and cost-effective capability portfolio to defend against, and reduce disruption to 
conventional missions facing, an unanticipated asymmetric threat’s attack? 
C. SURVEY OF RECENT STUDIES 
A survey of extensive studies on countering small boat attacks from different 
perspectives provides the academic context to this research’s focus on the knowledge gap 
of countering conventional small boat swarm attacks. 
Sirrs (2002) examines the application of better operational planning that included 
the employment and sequencing of operational tasks, such as the use of air superiority, 
surveillance, and operational fires, to counter small boat attacks with Iranian coastal 
waters as one scenario. Martinez Tiburcio (2005) and Singh (2010) studies capability 
factors that were important in enhancing coastal defense for the Campeche Sound and 
Israeli coast, respectively.  
On better modeling and simulation techniques, Harney (2003) develops a Java-
based application that can model “what-if” threat scenarios in higher fidelity. Ng (2007) 
develops the modeling of dynamic threat behaviors. Sullivan (2006) builds on Harney’s 
work by expanding the fidelity of the simulation model in force protection scenarios. 
Wong (2010) employs agent-based simulation to study the impact of different defender 
tactics versus different attacker tactics in a port security setting. 
Force protection of ships was another key area. Tiwari (2008) studies training and 
small caliber weapons (25 mm and below) gaps and enhancements in protecting a 
destroyer (DDG) against terrorist small boat attacks. Abel (2009) finds that having a mix 
of system-directed weapons, as opposed to the existing manually aimed weapons, on a 
frigate significantly enhances survival in counter-piracy patrol missions. McKeown 
(2012) employs agent-based simulation in studying Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) 
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effectiveness against small boat attackers that use suicide weapons. Kaymal (2013) 
researches the effectiveness of protecting a convoy against explosive-laden terrorist 
boats. 
On exploiting net-centric maritime warfare, Marland, Galligan, and Galdorisi 
(2005) use agent-based simulation to examine the impact of four different capability 
levels of shared situation awareness (from none to having inorganic targeting) on 
defending against three different categories of small boat attackersfrom rocket-
propelled grenades (RPG) to ASCMs. They find that against the small boat attackers with 
ASCMs, it is useful to employ helicopters or unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) 
at far-enough ranges to reduce the threat to friendly ships. The fundamental gain is early 
attrition and maximizing ships’ weapon ranges. 
The knowledge gap observed across these studies is the analysis of an energy-
efficient and cost-effective capability portfolio in countering small boat swarm attacks 
utilizing ASCMs. Previous studies focus solely on force protection effectiveness. This 
thesis addresses this gap. 
D. SMALL BOAT DEFINITION 
It is necessary to define the class of small boats being studied, as there are 
multiple definitions and small boat classes. Marland, Galligan, and Galdorisi (2005) coin 
a useful categorization that is referred to in this research. The categories are, in a broad 
sense, “type 1 RPG/suicide bombs (3-500 m),” “type 2 multiple launch rocket system 
(MLRS) rocket (8 km),” and “type 3–missile/torpedo.” This research focuses on the 
IRGCN small boats with ASCMs, which belong to the “type 3” category. The survey of 
recent studies showed that countering “type 1” and “type 2” attacks has been studied.  
E. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES  
The critical operational issues (COI) for the capabilities facing the conventional 
small boat swarm attack focus on the key gaps in a system (Stevens 1986, 19). 
Addressing the COIs requires an operational context. In this thesis, a carrier group is to 
conduct a primary mission of attaining air superiority and requires movement from the 
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Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf. The carrier group encounters a surprise conventional 
small boat swarm attack during transit in the Strait of Hormuz. The friendly force 
commander would be concerned about the ability to carry on with the primary mission 
and would want to ensure force survivability from the small boat attack as well as 
conserve weapons and fuel against the swarm attack. These two considerations affect the 
ability to accomplish the primary mission. However, it is not efficient to use costly 
defense capabilities against the cheaper small boat swam threat. Cost-efficient options 
should be examined. For this study, the identified COIs are: 
 
1. How well can the friendly force survive the small boat swarm battle? 
2. How much of the maritime force’s weapons and fuel is used in the small 
boat battle, with a view to weapon and fuel sufficiency for the primary 
mission post swarm attack? 
3. How costly is the defense capability option? 
 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While the COIs provide clarity on the key issues, research questions drive clarity on 
addressing the issues. The main research question is reiterated:  
 
 How can we select an energy-efficient and cost-effective capability 
portfolio to defend against, and reduce disruption to conventional missions 
facing, an unanticipated asymmetric threat’s attack? 
The secondary research questions, which can be categorized under force protection, 
weapon and fuel consumption, and cost, are:  
 
1. Force protection  How effective is the force protection of the naval 
force so that the naval force can continue on its primary mission? 
2. Weapon and fuel consumption  How do operational energy 
considerations constrain the options of a naval force that is defending 
against a combatant’s swarm of small boats? 
3. Weapon and fuel consumption  What mitigating policies (operational 
and doctrinal) can be applied to defend successfully against a swarm of 
small boats in a maritime war scenario? 
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4. Cost  What are cost-effective options for a maritime unit to defend 
successfully against a combatant’s swarm of small boats? 
 
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The research provides insights to decision makers on selecting an operationally 
effective, cost-effective, and operational energy-efficient capability portfolio for the 
protection of a maritime force against a conventional small boat swarm attack. This study 
recommends feasible operational energy options to be part of the capability portfolio 
against small boat swarms. 
The capability-based planning (CBP) process (National Research Council, 
Committee on Naval Analytical Capabilities and Improving Capabilities-Based Planning, 
and U.S. Navy 2005) aptly describes the value of this research. The process is defined as 
“planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-
day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that 
necessitates choice” (21). Capability-based planning aims to “provide more meaningful 
information and to better inform strategic-level decision making” (28) and “identify and 
analyze key risks so as to inform leadership decisions on resource allocation” (28). Part 
of the CBP process “must include ‘smart,’ low-resolution modeling and analysis 
(grounded in higher-resolution work or empirical data when appropriate) that puts a 
premium on higher-level insights rather than focusing on minutia” (7). 
H. SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study is a capability engineering effort that provides an analysis of options 
for a capability portfolio. This effort fits in the first two stages of the SE functions (see 
Figure 1), as presented by Hernandez (2015) in a SE3250 course lecture, as well as in the 
operational need and requirements analysis portions of the Department of Defense’s SE 
process (see Figure 2). Computer experimentation, a key instrument in the capability 
engineering effort, provides a method to explore possible tradeoffs, as well as acts as a 
means to generate data for the comparison of performance measures. 
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Figure 1.  Systems Engineering Functions. Source: Hernandez (2015). 
 
Figure 2.  Department of Defense’s Systems Engineering Process. Adapted from 
Defense Acquisition University (2016). 
This study proposes an operational energy-based examination of important factors 
that impact a capability portfolio against the small boat swarm threat at the task-group 
level. A task group typically comprises one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, two destroyers 
and one oiler (U.S. Navy 2016). Existing and maturing capability portfolio options to 
defend against the swarm attacks are analyzed. The modeled scenario is inspired by the 
IRGCN’s training attack on the mock carrier. 
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The screening methodology from Davis et al. (2008) is adapted to develop and 
screen different capability options. The proposed capability portfolio options studied are 
limited to capabilities reaching maturity within the next 10 to 15 years. Open source data 
such as Jane’s information on capabilities is used—actual confidential data could be used 
in a follow-on study to produce results that are more accurate. A design of experiment 
(DOE) approach is used to generate data efficiently that can yield broad insights from 
investigating the experimental space. The impact of different factors on the measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) is analyzed using the partition tree statistical analysis tool. The 
impact of factors on the different MOEs is tabulated for useful comparison. This study is 
unclassified and not based on interviews, surveys, or questionnaires. 
The scope of this research includes missile combat exchanges involving enemy 
ASCMs, friendly surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and missiles used against enemy boats, 
such as the Hellfire, Spike LR, and Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II 
(APKWS) missiles. Gun combat exchanges have been covered in previous studies (Abel 
2008; McKeown 2012; Kaymal 2013). Enemy missile and boat leakers will be the 
metrics for force protection effectiveness instead of combat survivability of the carrier 
group. The latter is highly complex and involves considerations such as missile defense, 
gun defense, electronic warfare, and ship design. 
I. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II is the in-depth review of related studies that forms the academic 
context and identifies the knowledge gap. Chapter III articulates the development of the 
simulation model, including the operational scenario used in the model. Part of the Model 
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) process is adopted where a simulation model is built 
and used to provide a systematic analysis of the impact of factors on capability 
requirements. The Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) simulation software 
was used to study the effectiveness of different capability portfolio options. Chapter IV 
contains the MOEs, DOE, and the analysis of experiment results. The different capability 
portfolio options are analyzed and compared using the MOEs as the basis. Chapter V 
summarizes the insights and recommendations. 
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II. ACADEMIC CONTEXT AND KNOWLEDGE GAP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Reviewing literature on countering small boat attacks provides the academic 
context for the knowledge gap this research addresses. While academics have studied 
multiple aspects on countering small boat attacks, there is still a dearth of knowledge on 
countering conventional small boat attacks made on a maritime force. Sirrs (2002) 
advocates the application of air superiority, effective surveillance, and operational fires to 
reduce the lethality of the small boat threat prior to inserting a carrier group. Better 
modeling of small boats attack behavior and combat scenarios provided a greater fidelity 
of knowledge in informing capability, doctrine and training. Studies on port security, 
coastal defense, high-value unit escort, and single ship defenses help inform gaps in 
capabilities and doctrine. Most of these studies, however, were found to focus on 
non-conventional attacks at close ranges, for instance, less than 5000 m. Research studies 
show these attackers typically employ suicide bombs, short-range handheld weapons, or 
both. One common thread observed across the studies is the recognition that small boat 
attacks continue to be a significant asymmetric challenge to friendly forces and 
infrastructure. Another theme is that these studies focus on countering terrorist small boat 
attacks utilizing suicide weapons, human-held ranged weapons, or a mix of both. 
B. BETTER OPERATION PLANS 
Sirrs (2002) studies operational plans to counter small boat attacks, potentially 
from Iran and North Korea in their coastal waters against U.S. forces. Such attacks are 
part of what he terms a “timeless asymmetric strategy for those smaller navies who are 
willing to confront opponents possessing overwhelming naval and maritime power.” He 
draws insights from the 1945 invasion plan of southern Japan codenamed OLYMPIC. 
Sirrs identifies that the Strait of Hormuz has offshore islands that provide good battle 
preparation areas for small boat swarms and that the close proximity of the shipping lane 
in the narrow strait to these preparation areas enhances the opportunity for a surprise 
attack. He assesses that shipborne defense capabilities are not fully effective against 
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small boat attacks and proposes that proper coordination and ordering of operational tasks 
is needed to reduce or defeat the enemy small boats and coastal defenses. The U.S. forces 
should conduct certain operational tasks to reduce or even eliminate the small boat threat, 
prior to inserting the carrier battle group. This includes achieving control of the air space; 
neutralizing the enemy’s means of command, control, and communications (C3); 
destroying the coastal defense batteries; achieving good surveillance on small boat 
operating areas; and destroying supporting infrastructure. 
This thesis takes a different perspective from Sirrs by studying options for an 
operational energy-efficient and cost-effective force protection of a transiting carrier 
group that encounters a surprise small boat swarm attack. The impact of island groups 
and the narrowness of the Strait of Hormuz informs the operational scenario. 
C. MODELING THREAT SCENARIOS AND BEHAVIORS 
Improvements for modeling attack scenarios and behaviors of terrorist small boat 
attacks provide higher fidelity for capability and doctrine development. Harney (2003) 
assesses there was a gap in simulating “what-if” scenarios amid then-existing simulation 
tools typically used to train sailors or enhance situation awareness. Choosing the 
important warfare areas of Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection, Harney develops a 
“fully integrated, prototypical, Java-based application” that incorporated “various Open-
Source, web-based technologies.” His tactical-level simulation tool, with 2D and 3D 
visualization features, is geared at improving “the tactical awareness and defensive 
posture of ships defending against terrorist attacks in port,” including in the areas of 
sailor training, doctrine development and tactics planning. 
Ng (2007) assesses that modeling threat behaviors typically had “predefined or 
random paths and fixed responses.” He suggests advancing the state of modeling by 
incorporating the changing behaviors found in asymmetric threats. His goal is to have a 
more realistic and higher-fidelity model of asymmetric threats to inform capability and 
doctrine development. Ng employs discrete-event simulation and a multi-agent system to 
model the complex and adaptive behaviors of the threats. In his enhanced modeling, Ng 
demonstrates that the threats can show more flexible behavior and greater ability to adapt 
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in situations. A wider spectrum of maritime threat scenarios can now be simulated. This, 
in turn, informs maritime force and coastal infrastructure development plans. 
The two authors provide useful insights into modeling and simulation (M&S), 
particularly on the strengths of visualization in simulation tools and the impact of greater 
fidelity in modeling threat behavior. 
D. ENHANCING PORT SECURITY AND COASTAL DEFENSE 
Sullivan (2006) indicates that there was a gap in determining “the most effective 
combination of systems and employment for a wide range of possible terrorist attack 
scenarios” to inform capability procurement. He builds on Harney’s work (2003) and 
expands the fidelity of modeling the threat, friendly forces and installations, and 
capability effectiveness in force protection scenarios. His work results in an M&S tool 
that is scalable and can be flexibly applied to different scenarios. The tool can carry out 
large-scale agent-based simulations, provide 3D visualizations, generate reports, and 
support statistical analysis. 
Wong (2010) determines that small boat attacks continue to be a potential risk 
because the attackers could mask themselves among numerous innocuous small vessels 
that moved in close proximity to valuable shipping and coastal infrastructure. He studies 
the impact of various attacker and defender tactics on the effectiveness of intercepting 
attacking speedboats. The analysis uses results from a scenario built with the agent-based 
simulation tool MANA. His study finds that “defenders are highly susceptible to 
diversionary attacks regardless of tactics employed, but their effectiveness can be 
improved by retaining sufficient defensive assets in preparation for a potential follow on 
attack.” Another insight gained was that “anticipating the heading of the attacker is a 
critical factor for a successful engagement.”  
Coastal defense against terrorist small boats, involving defense of nearby waters 
that lay beyond the port waters, is also of interest. Martinez Tiburcio (2005) assesses that 
petroleum facilities in the Campeche Sound continued to be potential targets for 
international terrorists. He studies the deployment of surveillance and interdiction 
capabilities to defend against terrorist attacks. He models the attackers and defenders 
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using MANA. Martinez Tiburcio found that “the most important threat factor in the 
scenarios is the speed of the enemy boats; and, with its broad surveillance and 
communication capabilities, the HAWKEYE is the most important navy resource in the 
area.” His study provides operational insights for strategizing naval deployments in the 
Campeche Sound. 
Singh (2010) studies the Israeli coastal defense, as the Israelis have deep 
experience in dealing with terrorist small boat attackers. He studies various capabilities in 
enhancing situation awareness of small boat threats in coastal waters. These capabilities 
cover the Automatic Identification System (AIS), inverse synthetic aperture radar, 
electro-optical sensors on aerostats, and synthetic aperture radar that are fitted on 
platforms such as aerostats and low earth orbit satellites. His study determines “the 
optimum number of aerostats fitted with an appropriate sensor suite” and provides 
recommendations such as to amend “existing International Maritime Organization AIS 
fitment policy from size-based to role-based fitment.”  
From the four studies, it is important to consider both attacker and defender 
tactics in examining small boat attacks. Agent-based simulations, such as MANA, are 
found to be useful in modeling the operational scenarios and providing data for analysis. 
Aerial surveillance, for instance, from airborne early warning aircraft or aerostats, is a 
key success factor in countering small boat attacks and is considered in this research. 
E. ENHANCING POINT DEFENSES ON SHIPS 
Other studies look at enhancing point defenses against terrorist small boat attacks. 
Tiwari (2008) says that an effectiveness gap exists in U.S. Navy ships’ abilities to defend 
against small boat attacks in a crowded strait, particularly due to the difficulty in 
identifying hostiles from non-hostiles and the short reaction time available for taking 
defensive actions before getting hit by the attackers. He studies the use of artificial 
intelligence to model small boat attacks on an Arleigh Burke class destroyer transiting a 
narrow strait. He identifies and recommends enhancements to overcome gaps in crew 
training and small caliber weapons (25 mm and smaller). His study provides a basis for 
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future work to measure the performance of equipment and tactics as part of informing 
capability and doctrine development. 
Abel (2009) finds that small boat attacks posed an increasing challenge to North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) frigates. He uses tools and techniques such as 
MANA, DOE, linear regression, and partition trees in his analysis. The simulated 
scenario is an artificial one, comprising a square with the frigate moving from the 
bottom-left to the top-right corner. The small boat attackers approach from the top-left or 
bottom-right corner, or both. The attackers’ weapons being modeled include the RPG-7 
and pistol. The defender’s weapons include a frigate with a main gun, an auxiliary gun, a 
close-in weapon system (CIWS), and a pistol, as well as a helicopter with AGM-114 
Hellfire missiles. Abel finds that small boat attackers with handheld weapons can 
potentially destroy a typical NATO frigate on a patrol mission. He also finds that “a mix 
of advanced, automated weapons is best suited for close-in defense against multiple small 
seaborne attackers,” as compared to the existing manually-aimed weapons. This would 
significantly enhance the frigate’s mission survival. His study informs capability 
development. 
McKeown (2012) studies the modeling of OPV effectiveness against small boat 
attackers that used suicide weapons. He also uses MANA as the M&S tool. The modeled 
scenario is an artificial one, with the OPVs protecting a “goal line” using a barrier patrol. 
The small boat attackers’ objective is to reach the goal line. The attackers are armed with 
suicide bombs. The defender’s weapons include three OPVs each with a main gun and 
Griffin missiles, as well as one unarmed helicopter providing surveillance. Three types of 
behavior for the attackers are modeled–aggressive, avoidance or combination. McKeown 
finds that OPVs needed to be sufficiently equipped with weapons to defend an objective 
area from an attacking small boat swarm successfully. The type of weapons onboard the 
OPVs, and the presence of a helicopter providing surveillance, have a significant impact 
on the simulation results.  
Kaymal (2013) evaluates the effectiveness of an OPV in escorting and protecting 
a high value unit against a terrorist small boat attack. The scenario is a high value unit 
escort mission taking place in the Strait of Gibraltar. This strait is chosen as a small boat 
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terrorist attack on two merchant vessels took place in June 2002. The attackers carry 
suicide bombs. The defender’s weapons include an OPV with a main gun, an auxiliary 
gun, and a machine gun, as well as one helicopter armed with a machine gun. Kaymal 
uses MANA and DOE to assess the operational effectiveness of the OPV in this scenario. 
His modeling results show that enabling the OPV main gun, or having a highly-effective 
auxiliary gun in place of the main gun, are significant factors for mission success. The 
presence of the helicopter does not show up among the significant factors as the 
helicopter was not important in every scenario run. 
The four works show that studies have been done on modeling and analyzing the 
close range battle between small boat attackers using short-range weapons and suicide 
bombs and ships using various guns. This research contributes to the knowledge gap by 
focusing on the long-range battle between small boat attackers using conventional anti-
ship cruise missiles and a carrier group; gun battles are not studied in this research. The 
use of DOE is observed to be valuable in maximizing insights gained from analyzing the 
impact of any combination of input parameters on output measures, and in making the 
experiment efficient. This author concludes that the use of statistical analysis tools, such 
as the logistic regression model, main effects model, second order model, and partition 
tree, are valuable in identifying and rank-ordering the significant factors. 
F. EXPLOITING NET-CENTRIC MARITIME WARFARE 
Marland, Galligan, and Galdorisi (2005) study the impact of four notional levels 
of network centricity between friendly units on countering attacks from three broad 
categories of small boat swarm attackers. The four levels are, in a simplified sense, “no 
datalink,” “local datalink,” “global datalink,” and “co-operative engagement capability.” 
The categories are, broadly, “type 1 RPG/suicide bombs (3-500 m),” “type 2 MLRS 
rocket (8 km),” and “type 3–missile/torpedo.” The model scenario involves a friendly 
naval convoy transiting a narrow channel populated with fishing and trading vessels. The 
small boats waited among the neutral vessels to attack friendly units. The type 3 boats are 
of interest to this research. This study finds that type 3 attackers typically outranged the 
guns on friendly ships. This means that the friendly force should employ airborne units, 
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such as organic helicopters or UCAVs, to attack the type 3 attackersat further distances 
where the friendly ships will not be threatened. Alternatively, the friendly force needs to 
enhance its anti-ship missile defenses. Four modeling tools are used, including MANA. 
The authors find MANA to represent both forces with sufficient detail and to be useful in 
analyzing such a combat scenario. 
Marland, Galligan, and Galdorisi (2005) offer insights on the need for better 
surveillance, in particular from airborne units, coupled with target reporting to maximize 
the range that ship weapons can be employed. Additionally, the friendly forces should 
exploit airborne attacks to destroy, if not reduce the numbers of, enemy boats. Friendly 
ships should be equipped with weapons with longer ranges to exploit targets found by 
airborne units at farther ranges. 
G. THESIS CONTRIBUTION TO ACADEMIC DISCOURSE 
The context of existing counter small boat studies shows that a knowledge gap 
exists in countering small boat swarm attacks utilizing longer-range weapons, such as 
anti-ship cruise missiles, in a scenario analogous to the IRGCN training attack on a mock 
aircraft carrier. This thesis addresses the gap through analyzing possible tradeoffs 
between weapon consumption, fuel consumption, and costs. 
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This research uses open source and unclassified information to develop a notional 
scenario and capabilities that could be representative of the real world. A suitably 
accurate scenario enables meaningful analysis of the trade space—between force 
protection effectiveness, weapon consumption, fuel consumption, and cost—in 
countering conventional attacks from small boat swarms. The approach is not to attain an 
exact representation of real world entities and their behavior. Future work could 
substitute actual information, including that obtained from defense agencies, contractors, 
and classified sources, for more precise results.  
B. EXPERIMENTATION AS THE RESEARCH METHOD 
As a key instrument in the systems engineering approach to study capability 
requirements, computer experimentation is a powerful and proven method. It is 
increasingly the primary choice for exploring the decision space of complex problems; in 
particular, the trade space in a capability portfolio. Experimentation enables analysts to 
obtain insights by testing different variables, such as force configuration and weapon use 
policy, with regard to certain performance measures. Such insights identify required 
capabilities that meet mission objectives. 
The operational scenario is a model inspired by the IRGCN 2015 training attack 
on a mock U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. Baseline capabilities, as well as alternate capability 
portfolios, are analyzed in terms of force protection effectiveness, weapon and fuel 
consumption, and financial costs. Computer simulation and DOEs enable systematic 
changes to input parameters in order to generate output data that can be used for complex 
analyses. Using actual entities or physical experiments is assessed impractical within the 
study timespan, cost, and level of effort available. 
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C. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO AND ENEMY CAPABILITY 
The selected operational scenario for building the computer simulation model is 
the IRGCN 2015 training attack on a mock U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in the Strait of 
Hormuz. Figure 3 shows this narrow strait between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman, and its proximity to the Iranian coast. The graphic includes the locations of five 
nearby Iranian naval bases (in blue) from which the IRGCN small boats can deploy.  
 
Figure 3.  Strait of Hormuz with Nearby Iranian Naval Bases. Source: Ozdemir 
(2009). 
The key assumptions about the IRGCN operations are: 
 
1. Surface threats other than the small boats, submarine, air, and anti-air 
(e.g., attacks against TUAVs) threats are not modeled. 
2. The small boats target only the U.S. Navy carrier as the lucrative, high-
reward target, as it is less worthwhile to commit such resources to attack a 
cruiser or smaller ship. This means sidestepping less lucrative targets, such 
as a littoral combat ship (LCS) or unmanned surface vehicle (USV), 
attempting to interfere with their approach to the carrier.  
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3. The larger Iranian boats (assume > 60 feet), that are more easily detected, 
avoid getting destroyed by hiding and staying out of the attack 
(Cordesman 2015, 33).  
4. The IRGCN has received intelligence on the carrier group transiting the 
strait, and hence deploys small boats to position and maneuver for an 
attack on the carrier.  
5. The scenario assumes a swarm mass approaching the target from the 
north, deployed from naval bases along the Larak Island axis, and a 
second swarm mass from the west, deployed from naval bases along the 
Bandar Lengeh axis. Literature show that the IRGCN have learnt from 
past battles and since adopted a dispersed swarm in a swarm attack 
(Cordesman and Lin 2015, 33; Gholz et al. 2008; Haghshenass 2006).  
6. The small boats are evenly divided between the north and west axes. 
7. The small boats operate in an “I see I shoot” manner. They are reported to 
be lacking in long-range targeting capability, and launch their anti-ship 
missiles only at ranges where the firer can identify the target 
(Haghshenass 2008, 13; Cordesman 1994, 70). 
8. The small boats each have a navigation radar for target detection, as well 
as binoculars and night vision devices for target identification. The 
detection and identification ranges are unknown and are explored in the 
DOE in Chapter IV. 
9. The small boats have little or no shared situation awareness, as there is 
likely no datalink between the small boats. 
10. The small boats transit at 25 to 30 kts when on patrol. They increase to 50 
kts when investigating and attacking.  
11. The C704 ASCM travels at 300 meters per second. 
 
The IRGCN force has a notional composition shown in Table 1. Key parameters 




Table 1.   IRGCN Small Boat Swarm Composition. 
Quantity 





5  C-14 
 
Source: IHS (2015a). 






- no main or auxiliary 
gun observed  
- small radar observed 
- C-704 has 130 kg 
warhead (cf. Exocet 
AM39 with 165 kg 
warhead that hit USS 
Stark) 
 
10   
Mk 13 
 
Source: IHS (2015d). 








Source: IHS (2015f). 







For the friendly force, the key assumptions about its operations are: 
 
1. It has to transit from the Gulf of Oman (East of Strait of Hormuz) to the 
Persian Gulf (West of Strait of Hormuz) for a conventional warfare 
mission. While on transit, the force encounters a surprise conventional 
attack from the IRGCN small boat swarm. 
2. It transits along the southern part of the strait to maximize stand-off 
distance from threats emanating from the Iranian coast. 
3. The carrier group, comprising one aircraft carrier (CVN), one guided 
missile cruiser (CG), two guided missile destroyers (DDG) and one oiler 
(AOR), transit the strait together at the top speed, 20 kts, of the slowest 
ship, the AOR. There are no changes in speed and route when attacked. 
4. The carrier group has superior long-range shared situation awareness (> 50 
nm) on incoming anti-ship missiles in the narrow strait (30 nm). This is 
enabled by advanced radar, C3, and datalink capabilities. 
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5. Friendly units have situation awareness on one another’s location and 
movement through datalink.  
6. The carrier group will shoot incoming C704 missiles using the longest 
range SAM (SM-2) followed by the medium range SAM (ESSM) and then 
the close range SAM (RAM). The maximum and minimum ranges for 
each type of SAM are modeled. 
7. The vertical launcher cells in the CG and DDGs are assumed loaded with 
SM-2 and ESSM missiles. In actual missions, there could be a mix of 
Tomahawk, ESSM, and various types of SM missiles. 
8. A salvo size of one SAM (as opposed to two or more) is used against each 
incoming C704 missile. 
9. A salvo size of one missile (as opposed to two or more) is used against each 
enemy small boat. A successful hit is assumed to destroy a small boat. 
10. The use of the Phalanx CIWS gun to shoot incoming missiles is not 
modeled. The C704 ASCMs are modeled to target only the CVN, which is 
not installed with the Phalanx CIWS gun. 
11. The LCS, USV, and tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) increase in 
speed when investigating. They proceed at maximum speed when 
attacking. The modeling of different speeds leads to more accurate 
calculations of fuel consumed in the small boat battle. 
12. The TUAV shares its situation awareness of unknown and enemy targets 
with the USV and LCS. The USV shares its situation awareness of 
unknown and enemy targets with the LCS. The LCSs and USVs proceed 
at maximum speed towards enemy targets identified by the TUAVs. 
13. At the scenario start, the LCSs, if present, are positioned ahead of the carrier 
group. The TUAVs and USVs, if present, are positioned ahead of the LCSs.  
 
The next section discusses the friendly force capabilities analysis. Other key 
scenario assumptions for the reader’s attention are: 
 
1. Gun battles (5000 m or closer as a guide) are not modeled as these have 
been studied in previous literature (such as Abel 2009; McKeown 2012; 
Kaymal 2013).  
2. The strait is assumed to be temporarily free of neutral shipping as conflict 
has taken place. Innocent civilians would want to avoid becoming 
collateral damage. Future work can include modeling neutral traffic for 
added complexity. 
 22
D. FRIENDLY FORCE CAPABILITY PORTFOLIO OPTIONS  
The approach for establishing a capability baseline uses today’s cutting-edge 
technologies. This serves to provide insights on the gaps in today’s capabilities and acts 
as the reference for comparing alternatives. With regard to the U.S. Navy (2016), the 
baseline capability is defined as a typical carrier group comprising a CVN (Nimitz class), 
a CG (Ticonderoga class), two DDGs (Arleigh Burke class), and an AOR (Henry J Kaiser 
class). The submarine is excluded as undersea warfare is not in this research’s scope. 
Table 2 contains the key capability parameters compiled from various IHS sources 
(2015e; 2016a; 2016d; 2016h). 
Table 2.   Baseline Capability Key Parameters. 
Quantity 
& Class Image 
Top 
Speed Modeled Weapons Remarks 
1  CVN 
Source: IHS (2015e). 
30 kts 
16  ESSM (0.5 to 
18.5 km range; 2 shots 
per sec) 
 
42  RAM (0.5 to 9.6 
km range; 2 shots per 
sec) Both maximum and 
minimum ranges are 
modeled. It is not 
realistic to have SAMs 
engage targets beyond 
these ranges.  
 
Notional firing rates are 
assumed and required in 
the MANA settings. 
1  CG 
Source: IHS (2016h). 
30 kts 
90  SM-2 (7.4 to 167 
km range; 2 shots per 
sec)  
 
32  ESSM (0.5 to 
18.5 km range; 2 shots 
per sec) 
2  DDG 
Source: IHS (2016a). 
31 kts 
96  SM-2 (7.4 to 167 
km range; 2 shots per 
sec)  
 
32  ESSM (0.5 to 
18.5 km range; 2 shots 
per sec) 
1 x AOR 
Source: IHS (2016d). 
20 kts No anti-air weapon  
Note: The submarine was excluded as undersea warfare is not within the scope of this research. 
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Additional capability options are examined as augmentation, assuming the carrier 
group is critically needed, as a whole set, to fulfill the primary mission post small boat 
swarm battle. The method of identifying alternate options is adapted from the Building 
Blocks to Composite Options Tool (BCOT) developed by RAND Corporation (2008, 39). 
RAND created this tool to maximize exploration of the composite options space. The tool 
intends to identify better-performing composite options that might have been left 
undiscovered if a less sophisticated manner of proposing composite options is used. The 
term “composite option” is used in this research to refer to the combination of the 
baseline and added capabilities. The BCOT, depicted in Figure 4, first identifies 
individual capability components or “building blocks,” such as a ship, aircraft, or 
weapon. Second, numerous composite options are generated from various combinations 
of the building blocks. Third, the composite options are modeled and analyzed, for this 
research, in terms of force protection effectiveness, weapon and fuel consumption, and 
cost. Fourth, the screened options are identified from the slew of composite options. 
Steps two through four are discussed in Chapter IV. This author expects that the screened 
options would be on or close to the Pareto efficient frontier (PEF) curve (see Figure 5) 
defined as a conceptual curve that connects data points that are at least as effective as any 
other data point with the same horizontal axis value (39). 
 




Figure 5.  Schematic Depiction of Finding Points near the Efficient Frontier. 
Source: Davis, Paul, and Beck (2008, 40). 
The building blocks against small boat attacks are options that were likely to 
mature within the next five to ten years. This timeframe would then be useful for decision 
making in the immediate term (present to next five years). The results of this study could 
lead to more efficient ways of countering the IRGCN small boat swarm or similar attack 
scenarios. The identified building blocks are a notional set, and represent a good spread 
of options across surface/airborne and manned/unmanned platforms. This notional set is 
not meant to be exhaustive, but is representative of maturing technologies. A literature 
survey reveals the following building blocks.  
The AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire has been modified to represent the surface-to-
surface missile module (SSMM) on either LCS class, according to IHS (2015g). Each 
SSMM contains 24 Hellfire missiles. The modified Hellfire missiles, with a range of 8.3 
km, were test fired at sea in June 2015. The SSMM is expected to be deployed in late 
2017. 
Another building block is the 11 m USV armed with Spike LR missiles. 
According to IHS (2012), this is a project developed to deal with asymmetric swarm boat 
attacks. The proof-of-concept demonstration occurred in October 2012. Related to this 
development is the testing of “autonomous control of at least five USVs for escort and 
attack missions” in 2014 by the U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR) (Brizzolara 2015). 
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In this research, composite options of up to five autonomous 11 m USVs armed with 
Spike LR missiles are studied. Non-autonomous USVs are not considered so that 
standalone USV operations can be explored. The USVs are assumed deployed from 
another ship if not carried by the LCS.  
A third system to be considered is the Fire Scout MQ-8B TUAV armed with 
APKWS missiles. The APKWS uses 70 mm rockets modified with laser guidance. 
According to IHS (2016h), the APKWS was being integrated into the Fire Scout as of 
2012. In 2013, the APKWS was test-fired at sea against high speed surface targets (IHS 
2016a). 
Table 3 summarizes the key capability parameters of each building block 
compiled from various IHS sources (2012; 2016d; 2016h). Some may argue that laser 
weapons and manned helicopters should be included in the building blocks. This author 
assessed that laser weapon technology would not mature at least for the next ten to fifteen 
years. In a study on “Viable Short-Term Directed Energy Weapon Naval Solutions” 
(Team Bravo Cohort 19 2013, 101), it was found that the maximum effective range 
against a 2-cm-thick aluminum-hull small boat moving at 45 kts was at best 1000 m. This 
is not effective against small boats that can launch anti-ship missiles at much greater 
ranges. The manned helicopter, on the other hand, can be represented by the TUAV as a 
surrogate. Furthermore, involving one or more manned helicopters could place additional 
risk on human lives if anti-air threats are present. A TUAV will have no loss of onboard 
aircrew if shot down. 
  
 26











Source: Eshel (2015). 
40 kts 24  Hellfire (0.5 to 8.3 km range) 
Up to 12 Freedom 
class LCSs are 
explored in this 
research. Future work 
could include the 
Independence class 
LCS in the M&S.  
 
Autonomous 





40 kts 2  Spike LR (0.2 to 4 km range) 
Up to 5 Spike-USVs 










 Source: Osborn (2013). 
125 kts 12  APKWS (1.1 to 5 km range) 
Up to 24 TUAVs are 
explored in this 
research. 12 LCSs 
could only carry up 
to 24 TUAVs. 
 
Chapter IV of this thesis systematically explores various values for the unknown 
capability parameters. These include the detection ranges and identification ranges for the 
LCS, USV, and TUAV, as well as the hit probabilities for the SM-2, ESSM, RAM, 
Hellfire, Spike LR, and APKWS missiles. Although the actual parameter values are 
unknown, a methodical study of them provides important information about the range of 
values that have significant influence on the performance measures of interest. 
E. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This research involves a large-scale simulation. This type of simulation typically 
varies hundreds or thousands of factors, and with multiple levels per factor. Efforts, such 
as by Powers, Sanchez and Lucas (2002) and Sanchez et al. (2012), advocate the use and 
benefits of large-scale simulation experiments, enabled by technological advances in 
computing power, to provide powerful insights from such experiments. A small-scale 
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simulation experiment involving only a few factors is likely to produce fewer insights 
because of its limited scope. A large-scale study with factors varied in an ad hoc manner 
cannot be used to identify the most important factors, while one wherein each factor is 
varied one at a time cannot reveal how the performance changes when the factors are 
varied together (Sanchez and Wan 2015).  
There are several reasons for using MANA, a simulation software developed by 
the New Zealand Defence Technology Agency. MANA employs agent-based simulation. 
This type of simulation captures unanticipated results that may arise from behavioral 
interactions between agents (e.g., ships, small boats, USVs and TUAVs). MANA is 
designed as a distillation model that eliminates unnecessary complex computations (e.g., 
missile ballistics) but can adequately produce required data for complex analysis. 
Compatibility with the Naval Postgraduate School’s SEED Center suite of data farming 
tools is also important. The Center has a powerful computing cluster that can execute 
large-scale MANA simulation experiments, as well as automate the varying of 
parameters in each simulation run and the processing of output data. Previous theses that 
analyze capability effectiveness and use MANA, such as in Abel (2009), McKeown 
(2012), and Kaymal (2013), also show the useful application of this tool. MANA-V 
version 5.09.04 is used. Figure 6 shows the snapshot of a simulation run that incorporated 
the operational scenario, capabilities, and key assumptions. 
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Figure 6.  Snapshot of a Simulation Run in MANA. 
The simulation constraints and settings in MANA could have had some influence 
on the model results. These key constraints and settings are: 
 
1. Combat exchanges could sometimes involve multiple attacks on the same 
target by multiple units or by more than one weapon from the same unit. 
This would make the number of expended weapons larger than if using a 
one-weapon-at-a-time-per-target rule. Kill assessment is instantaneous and 
prevents any further multiple attacks. 
2. A model time step of 1.0 s is used. Each run (battle) ran for 4500 s (one 
hour and fifteen minutes), without a stop condition, in simulation time. All 
combat exchanges typically complete by about 4000 s. 
3. A simple mode for line-of-sight calculations is used. This is adequate for 
modeling the TUAV operating in the air and all vessels operating at sea 
level. 
4. The weapons of the different platforms are set to fire at the nearest valid 
target when there is more than one target. 
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5. The sensor detection and classification (identification) ranges used the 
cookie-cutter mode. A valid target is detected/classified with a probability 
of one when within range. The sensor detection and classification ranges 
are, however, varied in the experiment. 
6. The weapon hit probabilities used the cookie-cutter mode. A single hit 
probability value is uniformly applied over the minimum to maximum 
range of the weapon. 
7. Each run used a different random seed. 
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IV. MODEL EXPLORATION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The MOEs address the research questions in this thesis. Two or more measures of 
performance (MOP) support each MOE. Each MOP quantifies the performance of a 
capability portfolio option with respect to its attributes, along with data requirements to 
enable its measurement. The DOE maximized insights from the simulation experiment 
and ensured simulation completion within a practical time. This study examines factors 
under the general categories of “adding capabilities,” “varying tactics,” or “exhibiting 
uncertainty.” The simulation runs and open literature provide data for analysis. We used 
statistical analysis tools in JMP to derive insights on any cause-and-effect between the 
input factors and MOPs.  
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCES 
The MOEs are linked directly to the critical operational issues and appraise how 
well a system meets mission objectives under a given set of circumstances (Stevens 1986, 
36). With reference to Stevens’ guidance on writing good MOEs (55), each of the three 
COIs has an associated MOE defined as follows: 
 
1. How well does the capability portfolio option ensure force protection?  
2. How efficient is the capability portfolio option in terms of weapons and 
fuel consumption? 
3. How cost-efficient is the capability portfolio option? 
 
The MOPs are defined based on three considerations. Each MOP has to be 
relevant to the MOE. The data required for each MOP has to be obtainable, in this case, 
from the MANA modeling and open data sources. All MOPs are formulated so that, 
visually, lower is better on charts. Table 4 lists the MOEs, MOPs, and data requirements. 
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Table 4.   Measures of Effectiveness, Measures of Performance and Data 
Requirements. 
MOE MOPs Data Requirements 
1. How well does 
the capability 
option ensure force 
protection? 
1. How many missile leakers 
occurred? 
a. Number of C704 missile leakers that reached 
CVN. 
2. How many enemy boat 
leakers occurred? 
b. Number of enemy boat leakers that reached 4 
km of CVN 
2. How efficient is 
the capability 
option in weapon 
and fuel 
consumption? 
3. % of total SM-2 used?  c. Number of SM-2 used d. Number of SM-2 carried 
4. % of total ESSM used? e. Number of ESSM used f. Number of ESSM carried 
5. % of total RAM used? g. Number of RAM used h. Number of RAM carried 
6. % of total Hellfire used? i. Number of Hellfire missiles used j. Number of Hellfire missiles carried 
7. % of total Spike used? k. Number of Spike LR missiles used l. Number of Spike LR missiles carried 
8. % of total APKWS used? m. Number of APKWS missiles used n. Number of APKWS missiles carried 
9. LCS & USV fuel used? 
o. Time spent at different speeds for each LCS 
and USV 
p. Fuel consumption data for LCS and USV 
10. TUAV fuel used? q. Time spent at different speeds for each TUAV r. Fuel consumption data for TUAV 
3. How cost-
efficient is the 
capability option? 
11. Cost of total weapons used? 
c. Number of SM-2 used 
e. Number of ESSM used 
g. Number of RAM used 
i. Number of Hellfire missiles used 
k. Number of Spike LR missiles used 
m. Number of APKWS missiles used 
s. Unit cost for each type of missile 
12. Cost of additional platforms?
t. Number of LCSs deployed 
u. Number of USVs deployed 
v. Number of TUAVs deployed 
w. Unit cost for each type of platform 
 
Under MOE 1, two MOPs are defined. MOP 1 measures the number of C704 
leakers that reach the CVN. Leakers occur when there are more incoming missiles than 
the carrier group’s SM-2, ESSM, or RAM can counter within the constraints of the 
respective engagement envelopes. Measuring the probability of CVN survival is a 
separate and more complex study left for follow-on research, although MOP 1 results 
could become inputs to such a study for further analysis. On considering the number of 
C704 being launched and the proportion of C704s that leaked, these are deemed not 
useful as compared to the number of C704 leakers. The number of C704 being launched 
 33
closely correlates with the number of small boat leakers, which is defined as MOP 2. The 
proportion of C704 leakers could mask the magnitude of the problem. For instance, there 
could be a low proportion of leakers even though there was a significant number of 
leakers. MOP 2 measures the number of enemy small boat leakers. This is defined as the 
number of enemy small boats that reach within 4 km of the CVN. The notional 4 km 
represents a suitable transition to a battle involving handheld/shoulder-launch weapons, 
suicide explosives, or both, with the CVN. These close-range battles have been modeled 
in other studies (Abel 2008; McKeown 2012; Kaymal 2013). The MOP 2 results could 
become inputs to similar future studies for further analysis. MANA is configured to 
provide data for data requirements a and b.  
For MOE 2, eight MOPs were defined. MOPs 3 to 8 measure the proportion of 
friendly missiles used. The MOPs 3 to 5 are for each type of SAM. The MOPs 6 to 8 are 
for each type of missile used against the enemy small boats. The formulas for MOPs 3 to 
8 are the number of missiles used divided by the total number of the same missile carried 
by the force. The use of proportion of missiles for MOPs 3 to 8 provides a good sense of 
missiles used and missiles remaining in the force, as compared to the expended or 
remaining number of missiles. MANA output data meets data requirements c, e, g, i, k, 
and m. Data for requirements d, f, h, j, l, and n are calculated from the input factors.  
Still under MOE 2, MOPs 9 and 10 measure the fuel consumed by all LCSs and 
USVs, as well as all TUAVs respectively. The fuel consumed by the baseline capability 
(i.e., the ships in the carrier group) is not measured, as the composition and speed of the 
carrier group is invariant across all capability options being analyzed. These ships move 
at a nominal speed of 20 kts, the maximum speed of the oiler. The total fuel consumed by 
the added force depended on the speed and components of the added force. The formulas 
for the two MOPs are the speed of each platform multiplied by the associated fuel 
consumption rate. MANA is configured to provide the time spent at the different speeds 
in meeting data requirements o and q. Notional data sources meet data requirements p 
and r. Table 5 shows the different nominal speeds modeled for the LCS, USV, and 
TUAV, and the associated fuel consumption rates. 
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Table 5.   LCS, USV and TUAV Modeled Speeds and Fuel Data. 
Platform Behavior Nominal Speed 
Fuel Consumption 
Rate Remarks and Data Source 
LCS 
Transiting 25 kts 1500 U.S. Gal / hour From the average of the CLWP and 
PEO curves in Baggett (2008, 37, 
Figure 9). 
Investigating contact 30 kts 2050 U.S. Gal / hour
Attacking enemy 40 kts 3500 U.S. Gal / hour
USV 
Transiting 25 kts 10 U.S. Gal / hour From the fuel performance table of 
a proxy vessel (a dual engine 7 m 
speedboat) in Boattest (2015). 
Investigating contact 30 kts 12 U.S. Gal / hour 
Attacking enemy 40 kts 20 U.S. Gal / hour 
TUAV 
Transiting 80 kts 95 lb / hour 100 lb/hr from Ong (2014, 24) is 
assumed for 100 kts. 5% decrease is 
assumed for 80 kts. 10% increase is 
assumed for 125 kts. 
Investigating contact 100 kts 100 lb /hour 
Attacking enemy 125 kts 110 lb /hour 
 
On MOE 3, two MOPs were defined. MOP 11 measures the cost of all friendly 
missiles used. This is a good measure of the cost of expendables (less fuel). MOP 12 
measures the cost of the added platforms. Platforms are typically costly, much more than 
expendables, and should be examined. The cost of the baseline capability is not included 
as it is invariant across all capability options being analyzed. The formulas for the two 
MOPs are the number of weapons/platforms multiplied by the associated unit costs. 
MANA supplies data to meet requirements c, e, g, i, k, and m. Data for requirements t, u, 
and v are calculated from the input factors. Table 6 shows the notional unit costs used to 
meet data requirements s and w. The cost figures, being nominal, are not normalized to 
the same fiscal year. The base years range from FY06 to FY15, but could be normalized 
in a follow-on study. 
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Cost Remarks and Data Source 
SM-2 $750,000 Assumed Block IIIA. Source: Deagel (2015). 
ESSM $905,000 Assumed average of Mk 29 and Mk 41 variants. Adapted from Oestergaard (2014a). 
RAM $760,000 Assumed Block 2. Source: Oestergaard (2014b). 
Hellfire $99,600 Source: Balle (2015a). 
Spike LR  $153,000 Javelin AAWS-M used as proxy. Source: Balle (2014). 
APKWS $33,200 Assumed 1/3 cost of Hellfire missile, according to Sax (2013). 
LCS $476,000,000 Source: Balle (2015b). 
TUAV $10,800,000 Assumed Fire Scout MQ-8B. Source: Balle (2015c). 
11 m USV $6,350,000 11 m anti-submarine warfare Protector USV is used as proxy. Source: IHS (2006). 
 
C. FACTORS 
Factors are input parameters of interest that are changed during the experiment. 
These parameters are examined, through the analysis that follows the experiment, for any 
impact on the MOPs. Controllable factors can be changed, for example, by a decision 
maker. Uncontrollable factors are parameters with unknown information or over which a 
decision maker has little or no control. 
1. Adding Capabilities (Controllable) 
This set of factors encompasses adding capabilities to the baseline capability (see 
Table 7). Factors 1 to 3 are the numbers of added LCSs, USVs, and TUAVs, respectively. 
Each combination of the three factors represents a composite option mentioned in 
Chapter III. The number of TUAVs is a multiplier of the number of LCSs, as the former 
is assumed to be carried and deployed from the latter. The lower limits represent no 
added capability. The upper limit for the LCS is based on the number of Freedom class 
LCS in the Orbat reported by IHS (2016d). For the USV, the upper limit is based on an 
ONR article that autonomous operation of at least five USVs was achieved (Brizzolara 
2015). The upper limit for TUAVs is based on up to two TUAVs carried per LCS (IHS 
2016d). 
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Table 7.   Factors Testing Impact of Adding Capabilities. 
No. Factor Lower Limit 
Upper  
Limit Remarks 
1. No. of LCSs 0 12 High limit based on Freedom class Orbat (IHS 2016d) 
2. No. of USV 0 5 High limit based on current limit of autonomous technology (Brizzolara 2015) 
3. 
TUAV 
multiplier of no. 
of LCSs 
0 2 Variable is multiplier of number of LCSs. Each LCS carries up to two TUAVs (IHS 2016d) 
 
2. Varying Tactics (Controllable) 
The second set of factors represents the use of tactics to improve MOP results (see 
Table 8). Factors 4 to 9 are the different SAMs constrained by decision for use in combat. 
The ships would still carry full loads of SAMs. Factors 4 to 9 examine if conserving the 
use of SAMs, whether as a single factor or when combined with other factors, has any 
positive or negative impact on weapon consumption and other MOPs. The low limits are 
set at zero, while the upper limits are set at the maximum load, to see if interesting 
insights can be gained. For this study, the vertical launcher cells for the CG and DDG are 
assumed to be fully loaded with SM-2s and ESSMs. In a mission, the launcher cells can 
typically carry a mix of SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, Tomahawk, and ESSM missiles.  
Factor 10 examines arming the TUAV with the APKWS missiles. If there would 
be no significant MOPs gains, freeing the TUAV from the weight of the missiles would 
allow more flight time for target reconnaissance. 
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Table 8.   Factors Testing Impact of Varying Tactics. 
No. Factor Low Limit 
High 
Limit Remarks 
4. CVN ESSM allowed 0 16 Baseline is 16 (IHS 2015e) 
5. CVN RAM allowed 0 42 Baseline is 42 (IHS 2015e) 
6. CG SM-2 allowed 0 90 Baseline is 90 (IHS 2016h) 
7. CG ESSM allowed 0 32 Baseline is 32 (IHS 2016b) 
8. DDG SM-2 allowed 0 96 Per DDG; baseline is 96 (IHS 2016a) 
9. DDG ESSM allowed 0 32 Per DDG; baseline is 32 (IHS 2016a) 
10. TUAV armed? No yes Not arming can increase flight time for surveillance 
 
3. Unknown Information or Uncontrollable 
The third set of factors covers key parameters with unknown values or which 
cannot be controlled by a simple decision (see Table 9). Factors 11 to 16 are the hit 
probabilities for each type of friendly force missile. Specified hit probabilities could not 
be obtained. However, the range of probabilities listed is reasonable and could provide 
significant qualitative insights on how such factors influence the MOPs. This rationale is 
applied in all cases in exploring the different factors. Operating conditions, such as 
electromagnetic wave attenuation, target presentation and target maneuvers, could affect 
each missile’s actual performance. Notional ranges are used to account for variations and 
add robustness to the modeling. The range of probabilities for the SAMs is set narrower 
and higher than that for missiles used against enemy small boats. 
For the TUAV, LCS, enemy small boat, and USV, factors 17 to 20 are the 
multiplier values of the respective platform’s classification range. This is used to 
calculate the respective platform’s detection range. Factors 21 to 24 are the respective 
platform’s classification range. The ranges in factors 17 to 24 are against surface 
contacts. In this study, “detection” is knowing the presence of a contact whereas 
“classification” is differentiating between friend, foe, or neutral. There are two 
considerations in assigning the notional ranges. First is the relative magnitude between 
the different platforms. The TUAV, being an airborne platform, would have a longer 
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sensor range than the three vessels. The LCS is a large vessel that would have longer 
sensor ranges than the two smaller vessels. The enemy small boat, at 15 m length, would 
have a longer sensor range than the 11 m USV. Second is that a platform’s detection 
range is longer than the respective classification range.  
Factor 25 adds robustness to the modeling by accounting for the possibility of 
enemy boats being more than that reported by IHS (2015a; 2015d; 2015f). 
Table 9.   Testing Impact of Uncontrollable and Unknown Factors. 
No. Factor Low Limit 
High 
Limit Remarks 
11. SM-2 P_hit 0.7 0.99 
SM-2. ESSM, and RAM set at higher range 
than Hellfire, Spike and APKWS 
12. ESSM P_hit 0.7 0.99 
13. RAM P_hit 0.7 0.99 
14. Hellfire P_hit 0.5 0.99 
15. Spike P_hit 0.5 0.99 
16. APKWS P_hit 0.5 0.99 
17. TUAV detection range 1 2.5 
Value is multiplier of classification range; to 
ensure detection range is always greater than 
classification range 
18. LCS detection range 1 2.5 
19. Enemy boat detection range 1 2.5 
20. USV detection range 1 2.5 
21. TUAV classification range 8000 14000 
In meters; TUAV should have the longest 
range, followed by LCS (large ship), enemy 
boat, then USV. 
22. LCS classification 7000 13000 
23. Enemy boat classification range 6000 12000 
24. USV classification range 5000 11000 
25. Enemy boats multiplier 1 2 Value is multiplier of enemy boats 
 
D. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
A time-efficient and exploration-maximizing DOE to examine all 25 factors is 
needed in reaping important insights. Running a full factorial experiment, one that 
explores every possible combination of different factor values, will take too long to 
complete. For instance, experimenting with two levels for each of the 25 factors will 
result in 225 or 33,554,432 design points (and most of the 25 factors in this experiment 
have more than two levels). Each design point is a certain combination of factor levels. If 
a design point took one second to run, a 225 full factorial experiment will take about 388 
days to complete. In contrast, a 512-design point experiment with 50 replications per 
design point will take about seven hours. Poor design practices, such as varying one 
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factor at a time or excluding certain combinations of factor values, can prevent important 
experiment insights from being uncovered (Sanchez and Wan 2015). To maximize 
insights and complete the experiment within a reasonable time, studies, such as Sanchez 
and Wan (2015), have shown that the experiment must be designed in a smart manner 
through the use of an efficient space-filling design. 
This experiment uses the 512-design point nearly orthogonal and balanced (NOB) 
design developed by Vieira Jr et al. (2013). Such a design can accommodate large 
numbers of discrete and continuous variables along with associated levels, as compared 
to, for example, use of the nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) design. A 
consideration for this analysis is that a NOLH design might result in fewer insights due to 
the inclusion of discrete variables with limited levels (Sanchez and Wan 2015). 
The NOB spreadsheet, available from the SEED Center’s website at 
http://harvest.nps.edu, facilitates the creation of custom designs by having the analyst 
type in the low and high levels for each factor. In this study, for factors that are 
continuous variables, extending the limits by 0.49 and then rounding results in slightly 
better boundary coverage by the experimental design. 
A 513th design point for the baseline case is added to the 512-design point set 
(see Table 10). This is important because this study seeks to identify capability portfolios 
that are as effective as or more effective than the baseline, while simultaneously reducing 
the weapons cost and energy required. The largest pairwise correlation for the 513 design 
points had a magnitude of 0.0261, which shows the nearly orthogonal property of the 
513-design point set. Near-orthogonality is advantageous for analysis purposes. 
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Table 10.   Baseline Capability Added as 513th Design Point. 
No. Factor Baseline Value  Remarks 
1. No. of LCS 0 
No added capabilities 2. No. of USV 0 
3. No. of TUAV 0 
4. CVN ESSM allowed 16 
No restrictions on use 
5. CVN RAM allowed 42 
6. CG SM-2 allowed 90 
7. CG ESSM allowed 32 
8. DDG SM-2 allowed 96 
9. DDG ESSM allowed 32 
10. TUAV armed - Not applicable 
11. SM-2 P_hit 0.85 
Assumed mid-point value between low limit 
and high limit. 
12. ESSM P_hit 0.85 
13. RAM P_hit 0.85 
14. Hellfire P_hit 0.75 
15. Spike P_hit 0.75 
16. APKWS P_hit 0.75 
17. TUAV detection range 1.75 
18. LCS detection range 1.75 
19. Enemy boat detection range 1.75 
20. USV detection range 1.75 
21. TUAV classification range 11000 
22. LCS classification 10000 
23. Enemy boat classification range 9000 
24. USV classification range 8000 
25. Enemy boats multiplier 1 Assumed as per reported by IHS (2015a; 2015d; 2015f) 
 
Each design point is replicated 50 times; this was a good balance between 
achieving a suitable sample size and completing the experiment in a timely manner. 
MANA uses a different random seed in each replication to have slight differences in 
force starting dispositions (within a predetermined box) and to calculate weapon 
engagement outcomes. The mean MOP results across the 50 replications are used in the 
data analysis. Percentiles of the distribution could be used instead of means in a follow-
on study. 
E. REGRESSION ANALYSIS METHOD 
The partition tree analysis is used to screen the important factors, with significant 
influence on the MOPs, apart from the rest. The analysis is done using JMP Pro 12.0.1, a 
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statistical software from SAS. Use of other regression analysis methods is not necessary 
since this study did not intend to fit linear or non-linear models to the results. JMP’s 
partition tool creates an optimum split in the tree using the factor and factor value that 
could best explain the variation in the output results (Sall, Creighton, and Lehman 2005). 
A split recursively builds on the result of the prior split, if any. The decision tree method 
in the partition tool is used, where a single pass is made through the data to produce a 
single tree.  
Four splits are done. This is a balance between attaining good predictions and 
overfitting. From the partition analysis, each significant factor’s contribution to R2 is 
captured in a results table. The R2 value is the amount of variability in a MOP result that 
could be explained by the four splits and associated significant factors. 
A snapshot of the JMP partition analysis output for the number of C704 missile 
leakers that reach the CVN is shown in Figure 7. The individual contribution to R2 is 
calculated from the R2 value (highlighted in red) multiplied by the respective proportion 
value (circled in red). Factors without significant influence have zero proportion values 
(circled in green; rest of non-significant factors are truncated in Figure 7). Besides the 
strength of the contribution to R2, it is important to know whether the correlation is 
positive or negative. This is determined from examining whether a higher factor level 
leads to a higher mean value (positive correlation) or lower mean value (negative 
correlation). For the example in Figure 7, the partition branches (circled in blue) show a 
negative correlation for the number of LCS factor and a positive correlation for the 




Figure 7.  Example of R2 Contribution Calculation in JMP. 
F. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT ONE  
The R2 contributions from the significant factors in the first experiment are 
summarized in Table 11, with factors in rows and MOPs in columns. A color banding is 
used to accentuate the different values  those with strong influence (0.40), moderate 
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influence (0.10 and <0.40), and weak influence (<0.10) appear in font color blue, green, 
and black, respectively. The minus sign implies negative correlation between the factor 
and the MOP. Throughout this study, the TUAV armed factor associates a “yes” value 
with a higher levela minus sign means that “yes” led to a lower MOP result. 
Table 11.   Experiment OneInfluential Factors and R2 Contributions. 
 
 
The following observations can be made about the results in Table 11: 
 
1. Factor 1 is most influential on all MOPs except for MOPs 3 and 7. 
2. Factor 3 has moderate influence on MOPs 7, 8, and 10, as well as weak 
influence on MOP 6. 
3. Factor 4 has moderate influence on MOPs 6 and 7, as well as weak 
influence on MOP 11. 
4. Factor 6 has moderate influence on MOP 5. 
5. Factor 7 has moderate influence on MOPs 3 and 11. 
6. Factors 8 and 10 have moderate influence on MOP 4. 
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7. Factor 19 has weak influence on MOP 7. 
8. Factor 23 has weak influence on MOPs 5 and 11.  
9. Factor 25 has moderate influence on MOP 1, as well as weak influence on 
MOPs 2 and 8. 
10. Factors 2, 5, 9, 11 to 18, 20 to 22, and 24 do not appear as influential 
factors.  
 
Key insights are gained from these observations: 
 
1. The number of LCSs (factor 1) is highly significant in influencing all three 
MOEs (observation 1). This is likely due to the LCS, with longer range 
and more missiles, being more efficient at killing enemy boats, as 
compared to the armed TUAV or USV. Killing more enemy boats before 
they can launch the C704 missiles results in fewer C704 missiles being 
fired and thereby less SM-2, ESSM, and RAM (MOPs 3 to 5) being used 
against the incoming C704 missiles. Using fewer SM-2, ESSM, and RAM 
generally results in a lower cost of weapons expended (MOP 11), given 
that the SM-2, ESSM, and RAM are more costly than the Hellfire, Spike, 
and APKWS weapons used against enemy boats (reference Table 6). 
2. The number of TUAVs carried per LCS (factor 3) is significant 
(observation 2) but not as significant as the number of LCSs, in 
influencing the proportion of Hellfire used, proportion of Spike used, and 
TUAV fuel used. This could be due to fewer APKWS missiles carried per 
TUAV and the shorter range of the APKWS missile. In comparison, there 
are more Hellfire missiles carried per LCS, and the Hellfire missile range 
is longer than the range of the APKWS. 
3. The number of USVs (factor 2) is not shown to be significant (observation 
10). This could be due to the small number of USVs (up to five) and that 
each USV carries only two Spike missiles.  
4. Arming the TUAV (factor 4) helps reduce the proportion of Hellfire and 
Spike missiles used, and results in a lower cost of total weapons expended 
(observation 3).  
5. The uncontrollable factors (11 to 25) do not stand out in influencing the 
MOPs (observations 7 to 10). They are mostly not significant, with only 
five occurrences of weak influence and one occurrence of moderate 
influence. This means that the capability portfolio options, generated from 
varying factors 1 to 4, are fairly robust across the variety of weapon and 
sensor performances as well as number of enemy boats. 
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6. A policy for limiting the number of SAMs used does not show up as an 
influential factor on the C704 and boat leakers (observations 1 and 2). 
This, coupled with the insight that allowing fewer SAMs to be used results 
in a lower proportion of the particular SAM being used (observations 4 to 
6), means that there is a possible space to limit and conserve SAM use 
(CG SM-2, CG ESSM, DDG ESSM, and CVN RAM, specifically) 
without resulting in increasing C704 and boat leakers.  
 
The other insights are: 
1. Allowing more SM-2 to be used results in a higher cost of weapons 
expended (observation 5).  
2. Having more LCSs or TUAVs results in a larger denominator of weapon 
stock, and thereby a lower proportion of the respective weapon being used 
(observations 1 and 2). 
3. The number of TUAVs, a function of the number of LCSs and the 
TUAV-LCS multiplier, significantly influences TUAV fuel used 
(observations 1 and 3). 
4. The number of LCSs significantly influences the LCS and USV fuel used, 
as well as the costs of weapons and added force (observation 1). This is 
due to the LCS being the greatest driver of diesel fuel consumption 
(reference Table 5) and platform cost (reference Table 6).  
5. More enemy boats would require more weapons to be used and increase 
the number of enemy missiles that could be launched, thereby increasing 
the chance of closing on the CVN (observation 9).  
6. Shorter enemy boat classification ranges means more enemy missiles are 
launched at closer ranges, resulting in slightly heavier use of the mid-
range ESSM and higher weapons cost (observation 8). 
7. Longer enemy boat detection ranges means detecting unknown targets 
further and investigating them earlier. This could have resulted in more 
use of the Spike missiles (observation 7).  
 
Preliminary PEF curves for mean missile leakers (MOP 1) and mean boat leakers 
(MOP 2) versus mean LCS and USV fuel used (MOP 9) and mean cost of added force 
(MOP 10) were plotted in Figure 8, assuming these were MOPs important to a decision 
maker. These MOPs were chosen to examine the efficient options in terms of force 
protection effectiveness, fuel consumption, and cost.  
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The PEF findings should be treated as preliminary. A study using a higher-
resolution model would be the next step. The nearly orthogonal property of the NOB 
design resulted in dissimilar sets of values for non-force configuration factors (such as 
SAM use limits, weapon hit probabilities, sensor ranges and enemy boat multiplier). This 
did not enable a complete like-for-like comparison between each force configuration 
option. The tabulate tool in JMP is a simplistic method used to generate a new set of 
mean MOP values mapped to each force configuration option. This was done by 
averaging the mean MOP results, grouped by the number of LCSs, number of TUAVs 
and TUAV armed-or-not. The number of USVs was not included as it was not identified 
as an influential factor. The number of TUAVs was obtained from the product of the 
TUAV multiplier and the number of LCSs rounded up to an integer. Selected data points 
that lay close to or on the PEF curve were labeled with the respective force configuration 
and 95 percent confidence interval. A 95 percent confidence interval was a range of 
values where there was a 0.95 probability that the actual mean lay within the range. The 
idealized PEF curves were not plotted. 
The instances in which the number of missile and boat leakers were close to zero 
( 0.5) occurred when there were three or more LCSs. A closer look at the data in JMP 
reveals three LCSs with five to six TUAVs to be the lowest cost and fuel consumed 
options. The horizontal portion of the four PEF curves show that fewer armed TUAVs 
are needed as the LCSs increased from three to six. At seven LCSs or more, it is possible 
to dispense with deploying TUAVs. At four LCSs or more, it is also possible to rely on a 




Note: The 95% confidence intervals for the mean MOPs 1 and 2 values are in 
parentheses. 
Figure 8.  Experiment OnePreliminary PEF Curves. 
The tradeoffs between force protection, weapon and fuel consumption, and costs 
are examined for the option of three LCSs with five to six armed TUAVs, assuming this 
was an optimal force configuration. Figure 9 is a JMP parallel plot of the MOP results for 
three LCSs with five to six TUAVs versus all other possible options. Each column has a 
y-axis in the different units of measure for the specified MOP. The horizontal lines 
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represent the different force configurations. Each line then, traces that specific force 
configuration’s performance in terms of each MOP. Data labels for MOPs 6 to 8 are not 
included as it is not meaningful to expect less use of these weapons that traded for less 
use of the SM-2, ESSM, and RAM. 
There are important results presented in Figure 9. The red line is the baseline case 
with zero LCSs and TUAVs, with data values for the specific MOPs in red. The blue 
lines are the MOP results for three LCSs with five to six TUAVs, with data values for the 
specific MOPs in blue. The figure shows the increases from zero to 8800 U.S. Gal in 
diesel fuel consumed (MOP 9), from 0 to 800 lbs in aviation fuel consumed (MOP 10), 
and from 0 to $1500M in cost of added force (MOP 12). The resulting performance gains 
are the 100 percent decrease in missile leakers (MOP 1), 99.8 percent decrease in boat 
leakers (MOP 2), 23 percent decrease in use of SM-2 (MOP 3), 35 percent decrease in 
use of ESSM, 49.4 percent decrease in use of RAM (MOP 5), and 61.5 percent decrease 




Figure 9.  Experiment OneTradeoffs for Three LCSs with 
Five to Six Armed TUAVs. 
G. IMPETUS FOR EXPERIMENT TWO 
In the first experiment, setting the data filter in JMP to have at least 70 percent of 
SAMs available for use in factors 5 to 10 filtered out all design points except for two. 
This means that insights are limited on the impact of varying other factors when not 
limiting any use of the SAMs. To derive a good set of insights in this part of the 
experimental space, another experiment was conducted with factors 5 to 10 set at their 
baseline values. The remaining nineteen factors were unchanged. The 512-design point 
NOB design was used with the baseline case added as the 513th design point. The largest 
pairwise correlation has a magnitude of 0.0261, showing that the design preserves its 
nearly orthogonal property.  
H. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT TWO  
The R2 contributions from the significant factors in the second experiment are in 
Table 12. The legend is the same as for Table 11. 
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Table 12.   Experiment TwoInfluential Factors and R2 Contributions. 
 
 
The following observations can be made about the results in Table 12: 
 
1. Factor 1 is most influential on all MOPs. 
2. Factor 3 has moderate influence on MOPs 8 and 10, as well as weak 
influence on MOPs 6 and 7. 
3. Factor 4 has moderate influence on MOPs 6 and 7, as well as weak 
influence on MOP 11. 
4. Factor 13 has weak influence on MOPs 2 to 5, and 11. 
5. Factor 17 has moderate influence on MOP 5 and weak influence on MOP 
3.  
6. Factor 19 has weak influence on MOPs 2 and 8. 
7. Factors 2, 5 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 do not appear as influential factors. 
 
Similar key insights are gained from the observations about the second 
experiment, and reinforce the key insights from the first experiment: 
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1. The number of LCSs (factor 1) is highly significant in influencing all three 
MOEs (observation 1).  
2. The number of TUAVs carried per LCS (factor 3) is a significant 
influential factor (observation 3) but not as significant as the number of 
LCSs.  
3. The number of USVs (factor 2) is not significant (observation 7). 
4. Arming the TUAVs (factor 4) helps reduce the proportion of Hellfire and 
Spike missiles used, and results in a lower cost of weapon expenditure 
(observation 3). 
 
There is a new minor insight observed from the second experiment: 
 
 Longer enemy boat detection ranges mean more boat leakers, greater 
proportion of SAMs used, and lower cost of weapons expended 
(observation 4). This makes sense as the enemy boats would detect the 
CVN earlier, and thereby speed up to investigate the CVN earlier. The 
impact of lower weapons cost is possibly due to more enemy boats being 
destroyed as a consequence of detecting and investigating the LCSs or 
USVs earlier. 
 
The preliminary PEF curves for the second experiment are in Figure 10. The axes, 
legend, and tabulation are the same as for Figure 8. The same caution to follow up on 
these findings by running experiments with a higher-resolution model applies. It is 
similarly observed that for the configurations of three or more LCSs, close to zero ( 0.5) 
missile and boat leakers occurred. A closer look at the data in JMP reveals three LCSs, 
each carrying five to six TUAVs, to be the lowest cost and fuel consumed options. 
Looking at the horizontal portion of the four PEF curves, fewer armed TUAVs are 
needed as the LCS increases beyond six. This time, it is possible to dispense with 
deploying TUAVs at nine LCSs or more (data point not shown on chart). At four LCSs or 
more, it is possible to rely on a mix of LCSs and only unarmed TUAVs to attain close to 




Note: The 95% confidence intervals for the mean MOPs 1 and 2 values are in 
parentheses. 
Figure 10.  Experiment TwoPreliminary PEF Curves. 
The tradeoffs between force protection, weapon and fuel consumption, and costs 
are again examined for the option of three LCSs with five to six armed TUAVs. Figure 
11 shows the increases from 0 to 8800 U.S. Gal in diesel fuel consumed (MOP 9), from 0 
to 800 lbs in aviation fuel consumed (MOP 10), and from 0 to $1500M in cost of added 
force (MOP 12). The resulting performance gains are the 100 percent decrease in mean 
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missile leakers (MOP 1), 99.8 percent decrease in mean boat leakers (MOP 2), 25 percent 
decrease in SM-2 used (MOP 3), 71 percent decrease in ESSM used (MOP 4), 70.8 
percent decrease in RAM used (MOP 5), and 59 percent decrease in cost of weapons 
expended (MOP 11). The legend is the same as for Figure 9. The tradeoffs are similar to 
that in the first experiment. The MOP data values should not be quantitatively compared 
with the first experiment due to the dissimilar spread of other factor values (such as 
weapon hit probabilities and sensor ranges). 
 
 
Figure 11.  Experiment TwoTradeoffs for Three LCSs with Five to Six Armed 
TUAVs. 
As a quick summary, the findings on the significant influential factors and 
optimal force configurations in the second experiment appear consistent with those in the 
first experiment, despite the removal of limits on SAMs use in the second experiment. 
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I. IMPOSING LIMITS ON MOP RESULTS 
Hypothetical limits on important MOPs, such as leakers, fuel consumption, and 
costs, can be imposed to identify force configurations that meet these limits. An example 
building on data from Figure 11 is shown. We seek to identify force options that meet the 
following example limits: the mean number of missile leakers (MOP 1) and boat leakers 
(MOP 2) have to be less than 0.5 leakers each; the diesel fuel consumed (MOP 9), 
aviation fuel consumed (MOP 10), cost of weapons expended (MOP 11), and cost of 
added force (MOP 12) cannot exceed the midpoint of the range of values. The data filter 
in JMP is used to identify the horizontal lines (denoted in blue) that meet the imposed 
limits. For follow-on studies, both absolute and percentage values can be used in setting 
such limits. 
Figure 12 shows that reducing missile leakers (MOP 1) increases the minimum 
number of LCSs needed. At least one LCS is needed when limiting missile leakers to be 
less than 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Impact of Imposing 0.5 Limit on Mean Missile Leakers (MOP 1). 
Figure 13 shows that reducing boat leakers (MOP 2) increases the minimum 
number of LCSs needed. At least three LCSs are needed when limiting the average 
number of boat leakers to be less than 0.5. Achieving close to zero boat leakers appears 
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more stringent and requires more LCSs, as compared to achieving close to zero missile 
leakers. 
Figure 13.  Impact of Imposing 0.5 Limit on Mean Boat Leakers (MOP 2). 
Figure 14 shows that limiting diesel fuel consumed (MOP 9) reduces the 
maximum number of LCSs and TUAVs that can be deployed. The largest force 
configurations have at most ten LCSs (with six TUAVs), and at most seventeen TUAVs 
(with nine LCSs), when limiting diesel fuel consumed to the midpoint of the range of 
values. 
Figure 14.  Impact of Imposing 50% Limit on Mean Diesel Consumed (MOP 9). 
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Figure 15 shows that limiting aviation fuel consumed (MOP 10) reduces 
the maximum number of TUAVs that can be deployed. There can be at most twelve 
TUAVs when limiting aviation fuel consumed to the midpoint of the range of values. 
Figure 15.  Impact of Imposing 50% Limit on Mean Aviation Fuel Consumed 
(MOP 10). 
Figure 16 shows that limiting cost of weapons expended (MOP 11) increases the 
minimum number of LCSs needed. At least one LCS is needed when limiting cost of 
weapons to the midpoint of the range of values. 
Figure 16.  Impact of Imposing 50% Limit on Mean Cost of Weapons Expended 
(MOP 11). 
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Figure 17 shows that limiting cost of added force (MOP 12) reduces the 
maximum number of LCSs and number of TUAVs that can be deployed. There can be at 
most six LCSs, with at most twelve TUAVs, when limiting cost of added force to the 
midpoint of the range of values. 
 
Figure 17.  Impact of Imposing 50% Limit on Mean Cost of Added Force (MOP 
12). 
Figure 18 shows the overall impact when combining all imposed limits. The force 
options are limited to three to six LCSs and one to eleven TUAVs. This first cut of three 
to six LCSs, each carrying one to eleven TUAVs, should be followed by a higher-





Figure 18.  Overall Impact of Imposing Limits. 
The analysis of MOPs in this thesis considers only the mean values. Decision 
makers may also be interested in other summary measures. For example, they may be 
concerned about making sure that there are no missile and boat leakers 90 percent of the 
time. Such an analysis will involve filtering of the data in JMP in a different manner.  
J. IMPETUS FOR EXPERIMENT THREE 
Having built a simulation model that worked fairly well, we conducted a third experiment 
to garner insights, if any, on possible “low hanging fruit” research and development 
(R&D) options that can reap significant gains in any performance measure. These 
options, which require minimal R&D effort for maturation, involve scaling the level of 
current technology or retrofitting existing technology onto a building block capability. 
The notional set of near-term options include:  
 
1. Duplicating the existing SSMM load (24 shot) of Hellfire missiles onboard 
the LCS to have a total of 48 Hellfire missiles, with the assumption that 
the payload can still fit onboard the LCS. 
2. Equipping the TUAV with a larger capacity APKWS-launcher, such as the 
19-shot digital rocket launcher found on the MH-60 (IHS 2014c). The Fire 
Scout MQ-8B, if not the more advanced MQ-8C, is assumed to be able to 
carry the payload. 
3. This is assumed to be within the payload capacity of  
4. Equipping the USV with more Spike missiles, such as through the 
installation of a quadruple launcher (Rafael 2010) or octuple launcher 
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(Eshel 2013). It is assumed that these launchers can be integrated into the 
11 m USV. 
5. Equipping the USV with the Spike ER missile that has a longer range of 8 
km (IHS 2015h), as compared to the Spike LR missile with a range of 4 
km. It is assumed that the Spike ER can be integrated into the 11 m USV. 
6. Expanding the number of USVs that can be operated autonomously from 
the existing five, by scaling the level of autonomous technology.  
 
Another key objective for the third experiment is to investigate whether 
decoupling the number of TUAVs from being a multiplier of the number of LCSs would 
make the former show up as a more influential factor. Operationally, this means that there 
can be more TUAVs than could be carried onboard the LCS ships. For such cases, ships 
other than the LCSs are needed to deploy the TUAVs. The 512-design point NOB design 
is used again with the baseline case as the 513th design point. The largest pairwise 
correlation still has a magnitude of 0.0261, which shows the nearly orthogonal property 
of the experimental design. 
Building on the factors used in the second experiment, the factor on the number of 
USVs is amended to have a high limit of 24 USVs while four new factors are added. The 
factor on the TUAV-LCS multiplier is changed to the number of TUAVs with a high 
limit of 24. The changes are in Table 13. A total of 23 factors are investigated in this 
experiment.  
Table 13.   Testing Near-Term R&D Options and Decoupling Number of TUAVs 
from Number of LCSs. 





#Hellfire per LCS 24 48  
#APKW per TUAV 8 38  
#Spike per USV 2 8  
Spike range 4000 8000 In meters 
#USV 0 24  
Investigate standalone 
#TUAV numbers #TUAV 0 24 Replaces TUAV-LCS multiplier factor
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K. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT THREE  
The R2 contributions from the significant factors in the third experiment are in 
Table 14. The use of color banding and minus sign is same as in Table 11. The R&D-
related and number of TUAV factors being investigated are highlighted in yellow and 
light blue, respectively. 
Table 14.   Experiment ThreeInfluential Factors and R2 Contributions. 
 
 
The following observations can be made about the results in Table 14:  
 
1. Factor 1 is most influential on MOPs 2 to 5, 9, 11, and 12. It has moderate 
influence on MOP 6 and weak influence on MOP 1. 
2. Factor 2 is most influential on MOPs 8 and 10. It has moderate influence 
on MOP 7 and weak influence on MOP 6. 
3. Factor 3 is most influential on MOPs 6 and 7. It has moderate influence on 
MOPs 2 and 4, as well as weak influence on MOPs 5, 9, and 11. 
4. Factor 4 is most influential on MOP 1. 
5. Factor 5 has moderate influence on MOP 8. 
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6. Factor 14 has weak influence on MOPs 1 and 3.  
7. Factor 17 has moderate influence on MOPs 4 and 11, as well as weak 
influence on MOPs 2 and 3. 
8. Factor 21 has weak influence on MOP 3. 
9. Factors 6 to 13, 15, 16, 18 to 20, 22, and 23 do not appear as influential 
factors. 
 
Key insights are gained from the observations:  
 
1. Increasing the number of USVs has moderate influence on reducing 
missile leakers (observation 4). Increasing APKWS missiles per TUAV 
has weak influence (observation 5) on reducing the proportion of APKWS 
missiles useddue to having more missiles vs. a same number of 
enemies. Increasing Hellfire missiles per LCS (factor 6), Spike missiles 
per USV (factor 7), and longer range Spike missile (factor 8) are not 
influential (observation 9). These, along with increasing APKWS missiles 
per TUAV, do not appear as useful near-term R&D options.  
2. The number of TUAVs has become more influential on MOPs 8 and 10 
(observation 2), as compared with the first two experiments. This is not 
surprising as the (standalone) number of TUAVs is the key driver of 
APKWS missiles being carried, when armed, and TUAV fuel consumed. 
3. The number of USVs has become more influential on MOP 1 (observation 
4), as compared with the first two experiments. This is likely due to the 
scaling of up to 24 USVs that distract the enemy boats from approaching 
and launching missiles at the CVN. 
4. The number of LCSs continues to be most influential across most of the 
MOPs (observation 1). There is some consistency with the findings from 
the first two experiments on the dominant influence of this factor. 
5. On MOP 1, the number of LCSs does not appear as the most influential 
factor, while the number of USVs appears as having moderate influence. 
This is likely due to the number of USVs playing a bigger role (deployed 
ahead of the LCSs) against the enemy boats now that it is scaled up to 24 
USVs.  
 
There is a new minor insight:  
 
 A higher probability of hit for the APKWS leads to slightly fewer missile 
leakers and a slightly lower proportion of SM-2 used (observation 6). 
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More enemy boats being killed by more accurate APKWS missiles means 
fewer C704 missiles that could be launched. 
 
Overall, except for scaling up the number of USVs, the suggested near-term R&D 
options do not appear to improve MOP behaviors. Resources should be invested in more 
significant factors such as the number of LCSs and arming the TUAVsboth have 
moderate influence on reducing boat leakers and proportion of SAMs used. 
In plotting the preliminary PEF curve, all except three of the 513 design points 
have accounted for some form of R&D. If the scaling of the number of USVs is included, 
since this R&D option shows a moderate influence on MOP 1, an incomplete curve with 
seven data points can be plotted and is shown in Figure 19. The axes and legend are the 
same as for Figure 8. The tabulation done in JMP, this time, is grouped by the number of 
LCSs, number of USVs, number of TUAVs, and TUAV armed-or-not. A key qualitative 
insight from Figure 19 is that close to zero (<0.5) missile and boat leakers are achievable 
at a lower cost (about $850M onwards), as compared to about $1500M onwards in both 
Figures 8 and 10. This is likely due to having fewer than three LCSs, along with the 




Note: The 95% confidence intervals for the mean MOPs 1 and 2 values are in 
parentheses. 
Figure 19.  Experiment ThreePreliminary Efficiency Frontier Curves (includes 
R&D Scaling of USV Numbers). 
L. IMPETUS AND RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT FOUR  
As the cost-effective or fuel-efficient force options for any mix of LCSs, USVs, 
and TUAVs might interest decision makers, a fourth experiment was conducted to 
complete the left portion of the PEF curves in Figure 19. This experiment assumes that up 
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to 24 autonomous USVs and up to 24 TUAVs (regardless of the number of LCSs) can be 
operated. The set of factors used is the same as in the second experiment except for the 
changes shown in Table 15. The largest pairwise correlation still has a magnitude of 
0.0261, showing the nearly orthogonal property of the experimental design. 
Table 15.   Factor Changes for Experiment Four. 
Factor Low Limit 
High 
Limit Remarks 
#LCSs 0 6 High limit reduced to 6 to create more data points on left portion of PEF curves 
#USVs 0 24 Assume R&D scaling of up to 24 autonomous USVs 
#TUAVs 0 24 Assume standalone TUAV numbers; replaced TUAV-LCS multiplier factor 
 
The preliminary PEF curves for the fourth experiment are shown in Figure 20. 
The legend and tabulation are the same as for Figure 19 except that MOPs 1 and 2 are 
plotted only against MOP 12. It is not useful to plot against MOPs 9 or 10 as options that 
can have zero LCSs, USVs, or TUAVs can appear. This can result in zero additional 
diesel or aviation fuel used from the portfolio baseline, and will clutter the vertical axes. 
The same caution to follow the preliminary curves with a higher-resolution model 
applies.  
With the number of USVs scaled up and the deployment of TUAVs unhinged 
from the number of LCSs, new cost-effective force options have appeared, as compared 
with the first three experiments. The added force costs of these options, however, have 
not incorporated the cost of additional TUAV deployment platforms added to the 
portfolio baseline. Close to zero ( 0.5) missile and boat leakers occurred, at an added 
force cost of $130M and upwards, for configurations such as 0 LCSs/7 USVs/8 armed 
TUAVs, 0 LCSs/15 USVs/7 armed TUAVs, and 0 LCSs/17 USVs/10 arm TUAVs. 
Within the cost range of up to $250M, force configurations that attained close to zero 
leakers did not have the LCSs or unarmed TUAVs. A search of the entire set of results in 
JMP also did not reveal any USV-only or TUAV-only force configurations that attained 
close to zero leakers. 
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Note: The 95% confidence intervals for the mean MOPs 1 and 2 values are in 
parentheses. 
Figure 20.  Experiment FourPreliminary PEF Curves (Left Portion). 
Figure 21 is a continuation of the curves in Figure 20 and explores the higher cost 
force options involving one or more LCSs. The space for attaining close to zero ( 0.5) 
leakers starts at one LCS for force options involving the LCSs; starts at two LCSs for 
force options without USVs; starts at three LCSs for force options without TUAVs; or 
with unarmed TUAVs. These different spaces are important to a commander who seeks 
to understand the impact of having only certain platform types and numbers available for 
a mission. A future study could employ a higher-resolution model to map the tradeoff 




Note: The 95% confidence intervals for the mean MOPs 1 and 2 values are in 
parentheses. 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The four experiments provide useful insights into the influential factors and near 
Pareto efficient force configurations, based on the operational scenario, key assumptions, 
and within the limitations of the model. They outline the requirements for selecting the 
systems that will form an effective capability portfolio against swarming small boat 
attacks against a maritime force. 
In selecting an energy-efficient and cost-effective capability portfolio to defend 
against, and reduce disruption to conventional missions facing, an unanticipated 
asymmetric threat’s attack, this thesis shows that the number of LCSs, as part of a 
reconnaissance force ahead of the carrier group, is most critical in reducing the mean 
missile leakers, the mean boat leakers, the mean use of SAMs, and the mean cost of 
expended weapons. This is likely due to the number and range of the modified Hellfire 
missiles the LCSs carries, as compared to the Spike LR and APKWS weapons. The LCS 
also enables armed TUAV operations by carrying and deploying the TUAVs. In turn, 
adding LCSs increases the mean fuel consumed and the mean cost of added force.  
Arming the TUAVs has a partial influence on reducing the use of SAMs, Hellfire 
missiles, Spike missiles, and the cost of expended weapons. This is mainly due to the 
APKWS being the cheapest missile used against the enemy boats. The number of TUAVs 
has similar effects but to a lesser extent.  
The number of USVs is generally not influential in improving MOP results. This 
is likely due to the small number and short range of the Spike missiles the USV carries. 
This thesis identifies possible energy-efficient and cost-effective force 
configurations the analysis of preliminary PEF curves with the number of missile and 
boat leakers plotted against fuel consumed and cost. 
A minimum configuration for the reconnaissance force, specifically having at 
least three LCSs and five to six armed TUAVs, is needed to attain zero and close to zero 
( 0.5) leakers, assuming the LCSs carry and deploy the TUAVs. Such a configuration 
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resulted from the LCS and armed TUAV being more influential on reducing leakers, as 
compared to the USV equipped with Spike missiles. This minimum force ensures that the 
naval force could continue unharmed on its conventional mission. 
Imposing upper limits, from an efficiency perspective, on the reconnaissance 
force’s diesel and aviation fuel consumption, as well as on costs of weapons expended 
and added force, reduces the maximum number of LCSs and TUAVs that could be 
deployed. 
Mitigating policies, including operational and doctrinal ones, to defend 
successfully against conventional attacks from a small boat swarm involve selecting a 
“right-sized” mix of LCSs and armed TUAVs, that can provide effective force protection 
and, at the same time, limit fuel consumption, cost of weapons expended, and cost of 
added force. 
Compared with the notional R&D options, increasing the number of LCSs and 
arming the TUAVs in the short term appear to be better investments for improving the 
carrier group’s survival against a small boat swarm attack. The notional R&D options of 
increasing LCS Hellfire missile capacity, USV Spike missile capacity, TUAV APKWS 
missile capacity, and Spike missile range are not influential. Scaling autonomous USV 
technology to deploy up to 24 USVs from the current five has a moderate influence on 
reducing missile leakers.  
The uncontrollable factors are observed to have minimal impact on missile and 
boat leakers, fuel and weapon consumption, and costs. This means that the capability 
options perform relatively robustly across a slew of different weapon hit probabilities, 
sensor range performances, and enemy boat numbers. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analyses from simulation model results in this thesis, a preliminary 
optimal force configuration would consist of three LCSs with five to six armed TUAVs, 
assuming the LCSs carry and deploy the TUAVs. This capability package would meet the 
mission requirements and fill the gaps identified during exploration of the decision space. 
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Further use of this research’s insights can be made. Changes to MOP results can 
occur when there are different resources or platforms available, such as increasing or 
decreasing the number of LCSs and TUAVs, and/ or whether the TUAVs are armed. 
Relevant MOP values can be aggregated into a single score as a more systematic 
method to select an optimum force configuration. In this method, there is flexibility to 
assign desired weights for each MOP according to stakeholder needs. 
Other work can build on this research. New areas of study include: 
 
1. Extend the modeling effort to incorporate both missile and gun exchanges. 
This will add fidelity to the measure of force protection effectiveness for 
the friendly forces. The modeling of gun attacks by friendly forces may 
result in fewer enemy boats launching C704 missiles or reaching the CVN. 
2. Add complexity to the model such that C704s missiles target ships other 
than the CVN in the carrier group. This can lead to different results for the 
C704 leakers that reach the CVN. 
3. Use alternate enemy behavior to examine the impact on force protection of 
both added and baseline forces; the enemy boats can choose to attack 
some LCSs or USVs before attacking the CVN. This can result in some 
LCSs or USVs being damaged. 
4. Shore-based and air-launched ASCMs can be modeled to operate in 
concert with the enemy small boat ASCM attacks. This is a more stringent 
operational scenario to stress test the naval force’s defenses.  
5. A crossed design, e.g., the use of one design for controllable factors 
crossed with another design for uncontrollable factors, would make it 
easier to compare directly the performance of different capability 
portfolios. This research used only the NOB design across both 
controllable and uncontrollable factors. 
6. Some neutral traffic can be added to the scenario to examine the impact of 
increased complexity in surveillance and targeting. 
7. The cost of ships and platforms should be normalized to the same fiscal 




This research provides insights to decision makers on selecting an operational 
energy-efficient and cost-effective capability portfolio for the protection of a maritime 
force against a conventional small boat swarm attack. It identifies effective and feasible 
operational energy options to be part of the capability portfolio against small boat 
swarms. A wide variety of other model-based capability portfolio selection situations can 
employ the analysis methods used in this thesis. 
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